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David Cohen* THE ECONOMICS OF 
W A D I A N  NA TIONAL RAIL WA Y v. 
NORSK PA CFIC STEAMSHIP 
(THE JERVIS CROWN)+ 
Introduction 
Economic analysis of legal doctrine assumes, indeed its relevance 
largely depends upon the assumption, that judicial decisions will have 
an instrumental impact on the future behaviour of firms and indi- 
viduals who are not themselves parties to the litigation which resulted 
in the specific doctrinal development being analysed. In other words, 
economic analysis assumes that the decisions of courts - and particular- 
ly, for what should be obvious reasons, the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada - have a direct influence upon the manner in which 
non-litigants will choose to order their affairs following that decision. 
Thus, the focus of a 'law and economics' analysis - as it is often collo- 
quially termed - is not on the legal entitlements or welfare of a parti- 
cular plaintiff or the obligations or responsibilities of a particular 
defendant. Rather, it is on the economic in~plications for other analog- 
ous actors of allowing or denying a claim brought by a particular 
individual or firm. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacijic Steamship Co. Ltd. et al.,' is 
particularly amenable to such an analysis. 
The Norsk litigation arose out of a collision between a barge and a 
bridge on the Fraser River. Near the city of New Westminster in British 
Columbia, spanning the Fraser River, stands a railway bridge commonly 
referred to locally as the CNR bridge. The bridge is owned by the 
federal government and managed by Public Works Canada (PWC). Al- 
though PWC had contracted with four railway companies to use the 
bridge, the principal user of the bridge around the time of the accident 
which led to the Norsk litigation was the Canadian National Railway 
(CN). The bridge was an integral link in CN'S system -joining the Van- 
couver terminus to the main line - and the railway sent, on average, 32 
trains with 1,530 cars a day across the bridge in 1987. This represented 
* Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. 
t The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Paul Fair- 
- 
weather. 
1 91 DLR (4th) 289, [I9921 1 SCR 1021. All subsequent references are to the DLR 
citation. 
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approximately 85 per cent of the daily traffic on the bridge. Under the 
terms of the contract which the railway had with p w c ,  c N  was respon- 
sible for repair and maintenance of the bridge when necessary, at the 
request of the owner. There was, in other words, a sufficiently close 
functional relationship between the bridge and the railway to cause 
most persons to believe that the bridge belonged to C N . ~  
On 28 November 1987, through a heavy fog, a barge, the Crown 
Forest No. 4, was being towed west down the Fraser River by a tugboat, 
the Jervis Crown, which was owned and operated by the Norsk Pacific 
Steamship Company (Norsk). The barge, through the negligent ope- 
ration of the tugboat, collided with the bridge, which caused extensive 
damage and closed the bridge to all traffic for several weeks while 
repairs were made. PWC, representing the Queen in right of Canada, 
claimed damages as owner of the bridge against Norsk as well as against 
the owners of the barge and the owners of another tugboat which was 
assisting the Jervis Crown at the time of the accident. Only the action 
for damages against Norsk was successful, and that decision - of Addy J 
in the Federal Trial Court3 - was not appealed. 
Consolidated with the action brought by PWC, was an action brought 
by three of the four railway companies which used the bridge.4 This 
claim, against Norsk and the other defendants, was for pure economic 
loss represented by the expenses CN necessarily incurred by the rerout- 
ing of passenger and freight trains which would normally have used the 
bridge; by losses incurred by CN due to delays in shipments of freight 
and, in some cases, failure to ship at all; and by additional shipping 
2 The data on which this 'impression of ownership' conclusion was reached is not 
apparent from the written reasons in the case.  onet the less, this relationship was of 
some consequence to the decision of the Court. As noted by La Forest J (at 339), 
'C.N. heavily stressed the defendants' undoubtedly high level of subjective and 
objective knowledge that C.N. as a particular company would suffer loss. My 
colleague Stevenson J relies on this factor as his principal ground for finding 
liability in this case. There is no question that Norsk knew and ought to have 
known that C.N. would suffer loss. Indeed, the facts reveal that the tug captain 
thought C.N. would suffer even more than it did, since he erroneously thought the 
bridge belonged to it.' 
3 26 FTR 81, 49 CCLT 1, 15 ACWS (3d) 357. 
4 In a pre-trial agreement between Norsk, the Burlington Northern Railway, and the 
B.C. Hydro and Power Authority Railway - Canadian Pacific, the other railway 
involved, chose not to participate in the litigation - the respective claims of the two 
railway companies were to be determined by the result of the action brought by CN. 
On  the strength of that agreement, the two railways took no part in the litigation. 
Consequently, it was only CN'S claim which was at issue dur in i the  trial, appeal, and 
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. See 26 FTR at 100. 
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expenses incurred by CN - as there was also interference with the 
watercourse, cargo which would have normally gone by ship or barge 
had to be delayed or transported by land. AddyJ allowed CN's claim 
against Norsk, dismissing the action against the others, and that 
decision was upheld by the Federal Court of A ~ p e a l . ~  Norsk appealed 
the Federal Court of Appeal decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed recovery for 
the pure economic losses suffered by cN. The decision, consisting of 
three extremely complicated j~dgments ,~ has generated interest both in 
academic literature7 and in lower court judgments.' On a doctrinal 
level, recovery for pure economic loss - that is, loss which is not 
associated with any physical harm to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs 
property - is a hotly disputed issue in Canada,' and the judgments in 
Norsk have done little to provide any definitive answers.to that dispute. 
In fact, the only propositions which are firmly established are negative 
ones." First, the case clearly stands for the proposition that there is no 
5 65 DLR (4th) 321, [I9901 3 FC 114,3 CCLT (2d) 229. 
6 In the result, the Court was divided 4 to 3. McLachlin J - L'Heureux-Dubi and 
CoryJ concurring - and Stevenson J wrote judgments dismissing the appeal and 
allowing CN's claim for pure economic loss against Norsk. La Forest J - Sopinka 
and IacobucciJ concurring - wrote in dissent. 
7 See Anne Mactavish 'Tort Recovery for Economic Loss: Recent Developments' 
(1993) 21 CBLJ 395. See also B.S. Markesinis 'Compensation for Negligently 
Inflicted Pure Economic Loss' (1993) 109 Law QR 5. 
8 See Comeau's Sea Foods Lfd. v. Canada (Minister of Fishaaes and Oceans (1992), 33 
ACWS (3d) 889 (Fed. Ct TD); British Columbia Hydm and Pmuer Authutity v. N.D. Lea 
& Associates Ltd. et al. (1992), 92 DLR (4th) 403, 33 ACWS (3d) 1304 (BCSC) ; 
Madntosh & N m n  (1981) U d .  v. Cew Roperties Ltd. (1992), 36 ACWS (3d) 733 
(BCCA) ; Can-Dive Services Ltd. v. PaciJic Coast Energy Gorp. (1993), 39 ACWS (3d) 385 
(BCCA); London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd. et al. (1992). 97 DLR 
(4th) 261,36ACWS (3d) 669 (SCC); Kn'pps et al. v. Touche Ross & Co. et aL (1992), 
94 DLR (4th) 284,34 ACWS (3d) 758 (BCCA). 
9 For a particularly thorough discussion of the entire area see Bruce Feldthusen 
'Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow' (1991) 
17 CBLJ 356. See also Joost Blom 'Economic Loss: Curbs on the Way Ahead?' 
(1987) 12 CBLJ275; B. Feldthusen 'Economic Loss: Where Are We Going After 
Junior Books?' (198687) 12 CBLJ241; David Cohen 'Bleeding Hearts and Pealing 
Floors: Compensation for Economic Loss at the House of Lords uunior Books Ltd. v. 
Va'tchi & Co., [I9821 3 All ER 2011' (1984) 18 UBCLR 289. See also, generally, B. 
Feldthusen Economic Negiigence 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell 1989). 
10 I am indebted to Professor Joost Blom, who has written about this judgment in 
some detail in 'Torts' in Annual Review of Lam and Practice (Vancouver: Continuing 
Legal Education Society of British Columbia 1993) 480-3, for his excellent analysis 
of the case. 
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blanket exclusionary rule to recovery for pure economic loss in Can- 
ada." Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that there is no single rule 
which will adequately address all the different activities that can result 
in pure economic loss - typically, the social contexts in which economic 
loss claims are generated involve the manufacture and design of mal- 
functioning products; the destruction of property which adversely af- 
fects the economic interests of third parties; the failure of governments 
to fulfil regulatory mandates; and inaccurate information leading to 
disappointed investor expectations. Finally, recovery for such loss, 
notwithstanding the category, will not be based solely upon the reason- 
able foreseeability of the risk of damage. According to the Court, there 
must be additional criteria or control devices to ensure that the 'flood- 
gates' of potentially indeterminate liability are not flung wide.'' What is 
immediately apparent is that there are few, if any, positive propositions 
which one might state with certainty as comprising the law in Canada 
with regard to recovery for pure economic loss.I3 
I began this comment by noting that the focus of a law and econom- 
ics analysis is not on the legal entitlements, welfare, obligations, or 
11 All three judgments reject (at 303, 367, and 380) the decision of the House of 
Lords in Murphy v. Brentruood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, which is seen as 
. - 
denying recovery for pure economic loss in all cases other than those which fall 
under the Hedlqr Byrne doctrine (Hedlqr, Byne 6' Co. Ltd. v. He& 6' Partners Lld 
[I9641 AC 465, 119631 2All ER 575). The 'incremental approach' which the Court 
adopted in Kumloops (City) v. Nieken [I9841 2 SCR 2, (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 641 is 
seen as the appropriate Canadian position. 
12 Thus, the liability for negligent misstatement in Hedlqr Byrne is based upon concepts 
of 'reliance'; the liability for lost use of a chattel in Riutmu is based upon a duty to 
warn of physical danger (Riutmu Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron W& (1984), 40 DLR 
(3d) 530 (SCC)) and the liability found in Kumloops v. Nieken is based on the duty 
of public officials to pursue their statutory obligations. The liability in Nursk was 
based upon 'contractual relational economic loss,' a phrase which La Forest J 
termed (at 291) 'convenient if somewhat barbarous.' 
13 La Forest J notes (at 291-2), 'The courts below and my colleagues, Justices 
McLachlin and Stevenson, are all of the view that CN's claim should be upheld. But 
this unanimity is more apparent than real, for they do so for different reasons and, 
indeed, there is significant disagreement on the determining issues.' 
As Professor Blom points out, there is technically no ratio to the case, although if 
McLachlin J's judgment is taken as the majority position, recovery for pure 
economic loss will be available in situations where the plaintiffs connection with 
the damaged property makes it virtually ajoint venturer with the owner. Blom goes 
on to say, 'Beyond that extremely narrow category, Nursk settles nothing, except 
that the courts will be open-minded about pure economic loss and will consider a 
wide range of policy arguments in deciding whether a particular category of such 
loss should be recoverable.' See supra note 10,483. 
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responsibilities of the particular parties to an individual action. For that 
reason, I will not focus further upon the decision in terms of its specific 
economic effect upon Norsk Pacific or its shareholders, nor upon the 
position of the federal government, nor on the rights or well-being of 
Canadian National Railway. Rather my focus is on the impact of recog- 
nizing tort liability or denying claims in cases like Norsk, first, on the 
activities of what might be referred to as transportationjim where those 
activities may result in property damage; second, on the activities of 
prop* owners who face the risk of damage to their property as a result 
of the activities of transportation firms; and third, on the activities of 
relational contractors who contract with property owners to use the 
property which might be damaged, and which therefore face the risk of 
economic losses (or the lost opportunity of economic gain) associated 
with the interruption of their business activities.I4 The important point 
is that this categorization requires that my analysis look to the future 
and the expected behaviour of firms other than the particular litigants 
who came before the Court. It is, on that level, quite different from 
doctrinal or principled legal analysis, which looks to rules or principles 
developed in earlier decisions and the actual behaviour of the indi- 
viduals engaged in the particular dispute. 
The decision in Norsk is very likely to have significant effects upon 
the manner in which analogous actors structure their future economic 
activities and, for this reason, it is particularly well suited as the starting 
point for economic analysis. The second element which makes this case 
suitable for economic analysis is that it involves firms and property 
owners and the effect of accidents on the wealth of those firms and 
property owners. While property damage did occur, it was damage to 
investment property. It was not damage to property to which indivi- 
duals might have personal or psychological attachments. The case 
apparently did not adversely affect the welfare or well-being of indi- 
viduals, except insofar as the shareholders of the firms involved in the 
litigation might have experienced an increase or reduction in the 
expected income stream represented by their shares, due to the com- 
bined effect of the accident and the decision. It is fair, as well, to 
assume that firms like Norsk and CN, and the federal government re- 
presented by Public Works Canada, are all interested in structuring 
their interactions in a way which generates wealth for their sharehold- 
ers or members. The link with economics is obvious. Finally, the judg- 
14 The relationship between these groups is schematically diagrammed in Appendix 
A. 
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ments themselves are amenable to economic analysis. The nature of 
the issues before the Court dictated that there be discussion of a 
number of points which can be said to have the flavour of law and 
economics. 
I Law and economics 
Law and economics is concerned with efficiency - that is, with the 
development or evaluation of legal decisions which result in the 
production of goods and services in society at a lower marginal cost 
than that associated with alternative decisions. Consequently, in this 
analysis, I will not be concerned with the 'correctness' or 'rightness' of 
the decision in terms of its consistency with precedent, notions of 
desert, corrective justice, equal treatment, or any other normative basis 
for decision-making. In evaluating the decision, I take the position that 
one should examine the efficiency implications of the rule it contains. 
Costs do count in developing solutions to human problems. 
Furthermore, law and economics recognizes that law is a social 
institution and that, in using the law, the legal system is attempting to 
respond in a rational manner to real, practical social problems. In that 
light, legal decision-makers should think carefully before using abstract 
legal concepts developed in one context to resolve issues in another. A 
law and economics analysis rejects the assimilation of 'economic loss' 
claims - which may arise in contexts as varied as product liability, 
negligent information or advice, delayed delivery of documents by 
couriers, and so on - and subsequent attempts to apply a single set of 
principles to the varied claims.I5 For example, there is, under current 
doctrine, a considerable immunity for negligent misrepresentati~n.'~ 
15 La Forest J made this point when he stated (at 299): 'It does not follow ... that all 
economic loss cases are susceptible to the same analysis, or  that cases of one type 
are necessarily relevant to cases of another. Nor does it follow that the constellation 
of policy concerns that have grown up around the issue of economic loss can be 
ignored. The fact is that different types of factual situations may invite different 
approaches to economic loss, and it seem to me to be at best unwise to lump them 
all together for purposes of analysis.' 
16 Until quite recently, in the absence of a contractual or  a fiduciary relationship, 
there was , n o  liability in tort for negligent misrepresentation. Although this 
situation was changed by the decision of the House of Lords in Hedlqr Byrne - and 
expanded in subsequent decisions in England and in Canada - the circumstances 
under which one might bring a successful action for damages for pure economic 
loss due  to negligent statements remain quite circumscribed. As Earl Cherniak and 
Kirk Stevens suggest in 'Two Steps Forward o r  One Step Back? Anns at  the 
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This immunity may be justified by the fact that, in the absence of such 
immunity, there would be an underproduction of information which 
has some characteristics of a public good. The increased production of 
information - predicated upon an immunity from tort liability - may 
offset the lower than optimal production of information associated with 
the inability of firms to capture all of the profits from the use of 
information by others whom they cannot charge for the right to the 
information. It should be obvious that that idea has little or no relev- 
ance to an analysis of the Norsk situation - in which we are attempting 
to determine whether firms engaged in transporting goods and services 
who damage property of other firms, should be liable for the economic 
losses of still another set of firms who contracted with the property 
owner for the use of the property. 
Finally, I must apply one codicil to the analysis presented here. A law 
and economics analysis of legal rules requires considerable information 
about the activities of third parties, the availability and cost of insur- 
ance schemes, the costs to firms of managing and reducing liability 
risks, the ability of firms to shift costs to others, and so on. This is quite 
unlike the information required either for a doctrinal analysis of a legal 
decision based on precedent at the appellate level, or for a judicial 
determination of liability in negligence in .a particular case at trial. In 
the former case, judges need information about prior decisions of 
Canadian courts on the point of law under consideration; in the latter 
case, judges need information about the standard of care reasonably 
expected of defendants, about the contributory negligence on the part 
of the plaintiff, and so forth. The information necessary to an analysis 
of the expected behaviour of transportation firms, it appears to me, was 
not available to the Court in Nmsk" Neither is it available to me. 
Crossroads in Canada' (1992) 20 CBLJ 164 at 169, a major policy reason for such 
restrictions is the 'potentially chilling effect on flows of commercial information 
upon which a modern competitive economy depends.' For a thorough discussion 
see B. Feldthusen Economic Negligence supra note 9. See also Allen M. Linden 
Canudian Tort Law 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths 1988). 
17 This information gap is a product of judicial choice about institutional design, 
reflecting the self-defined needs of many judges, and indeed of all trial judges, to 
justify decisions based on independent legal rules, and on the behaviour of the 
particular individualsbefore the court. My concern is that the Suprenie Court of 
Canada is much more than a trial court. It  is, of course, making decisions which 
affect the legal rights of the parties to the litigation. However, it is, as well, making 
decisions on which literally millions of others will base their behaviour in the 
future. It is dificult to defend the operation of legal institutions which reject 
information about, and analysis of, that expected future behaviour. 
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I1 The reduction of accident costs 
One approach employed in law and economics in the context of acci- 
dent compensation policy is to ask, simply, what system of legal rules, 
administered by what institution, will reduce the (net) costs of acci- 
dents in society?" That question can itself be broken down still further 
into three components. First, what set of legal rules will reduce the 
number of accidents which will occur in a particular social context? 
That is, which of the two legal rules debated in the Nwsk case - impos- 
ing liability on Norsk for CN's economic losses or immunizing Norsk 
from that liability - will be more likely to reduce 'primary accident 
costs'? Second, what system of legal rules will reduce the consequences 
of those accidents which do occur in that context? That is, which of the 
majority or  minority decisions will reduce 'secondary accident costs'? 
Finally, what system of legal rules, and what institutional framework 
within which those rules operate, will reduce the public and private 
costs of administering the accident compensation process? That is, 
which of the two legal outcomes will most effectively reduce 'tertiary 
accident costs'? Both La Forest and McLachlin~ touch upon aspects of 
these questions in their judgments, although neither is as well or- 
ganized or structured as one might hope." 
REDUCING PRIMARY ACCIDENT COSTS 
Transportation firms - airlines, shipping companies, trucking firms, 
and so on - are engaged in activities which, for a variety of reasons, may 
result in damage or losses to property owners and others. These acci- 
dents may occur for a number of reasons. Perhaps employees have not 
been properly trained. Perhaps senior management has accepted too 
many orders, forcing the firm to overuse equipment. Perhaps the in- 
spection and maintenance operations of the firm have been systemati- 
cally underfinanced due to demands by the marketing department for 
more advertising resources. Perhaps the firm has neglected to invest in 
weather-monitoring activities and thus ships goods in high risk situa- 
tions. Perhaps the radar system purchased by the firm for its carriers is 
inadequate. Perhaps the firm did not purchase radar for its carriers at 
all. Whatever the reason, society is faced with a situation in which the 
18 See Guido Calabresi The Gsfs ofAcn'dafs (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970). 
19 See, for example, the judgment of La ForestJ at 345-53 entitled, 'Part IV: A refined 
proximity analysis in contractual relational econon~ic loss cases,' and see also the 
judgment of McLachlin J at 372-4 entitled '(2) Economic Theory.' 
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activities of the transportation firm expose others (including property 
owners and relational contractors) to risks which they would not other- 
wise have faced. Moreover, absent a social institution which shifts those 
risks to the transportation firm, the costs generated by the accidents 
which do occur are not included in the price of the service which the 
transportation firm is selling. 
This externalization of costs results in two undesirable consequ- 
ences. In the first place, it reduces the incentive of the firm to engage 
in accident-prevention measures as compared with the incentives which 
the firm would have if it faced those risks and bore those costs. In the 
second place, it results in lower prices for the transportation service, a 
concomitantly higher demand for the service and, thus, more transpor- 
tation activity - and, ultimately, more damage and loss to third parties 
- than would be the case if the costs were borne by the. transportation 
firm. Most law and economics theorists would argue, therefore, that 
transportation firms should bear all of the costs of their transportation 
activities. There should be no distinctions among the various ways in 
which these losses manifest themselves - whether through personal 
injury, property damage, or economic losses associated with property 
damage. A social interest in reducing the number of accidents will be 
furthered by legal rules which allocate these costs to the transportation 
firm. Analysed in this way, all of the losses associated with the collision 
between the Jervis Crown and the railway bridge '(and thus all of the 
costs generated by transportation firms in general) should be allocated 
to the defendant in this case. Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court 
did not go far enough: there should be no restriction on recovery of 
economic losses associated with transportation a~cidents.~' 
20 This analysis should, however, require us to go further and determine whether 
liability should be generated by the application of a simple causality test, o r  
whether liability should be predicated on a determination of negligence. If the cost 
internalization rationale is correct, there seems to be no  reason to limit the liability 
of transportation firms to losses caused by their negligence. This appears to be a 
powerful argument in favour of making transportation firms strictly liable for all of 
the damage they 'cause.' While this may be true, it is not because it will result in a 
greater reduction of primary costs. Rather, we should prefer strict liability because 
it may result in lower secondary and tertiary costs. The standard of care which we 
expect of firms can be analysed using precisely the same tripartite analysis employ- 
ed in this comment. For example, concerns with minimizing tertiary accident costs 
will lead to preferences for a strict liability rule. This will avoid public and private 
litigation costs associated with determining negligence as compared with the costs 
of determining causation. In a strict liability regime, firms still engage in cost- 
effective accident reduction measures, but managers will determine when it is cost 
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However, this primary accidentcost-avoidance rationale for cost 
internalization to transportation firms, which would support the Norsk 
outcome, and perhaps more, must be qualified by a number of impor- 
tant points which support the dissenting position expressed by La 
Forest J, or at least significantly weaken the cost internalization argu- 
ment that might otherwise justify and support McLachlin J'S majority 
position. First, one could argue that the property owner 'caused the 
accident,' and that it is property owners who should internalize the 
costs of damage and losses to transportation firms when their bridges 
get in the way of tugboats." That is, the cost-internalization argument 
can be reversed, and one can argue for the allocation of accident costs 
to bridgeawning firms, to ensure that they engage in accident-preven- 
tion measures. Although this is an attractive argument, the question is 
better phrased in the following manner - in general, as between 
transportation firms and property owners, which of these can most 
effectively prevent collisions from occurring at the lower marginal 
cost?= It may be that the installation of protective barriers in front of 
effective to reduce accidents and when the costs of accident-reduction measures 
exceed the reduction in liability for accidents which are avoided. Managers are 
simply better at doing that than are judges. More important, ifjudges are systemati- 
cally wrong there is no way to correct them. If managers are systematically wrong, 
the firm will generate less profit than competitive firms and the managers will 
either modify their decisions or, one hopes, be replaced. Where the market will 
discipline managers, it will not - cannot - discipline judges. 
21 This is one of the more important insights Ronald Coase developed in 'The Prob- 
lem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 J. of Laru &Econ. 1. The welfare losses represented by 
tugboat accidents are produced as a result of the interaction of two or more acti- 
vities - in this case, bridge owning and tugboat operating. It is only because both 
activities occur in temporal and geographical proximity that accidents occur. 
22 It should he noted that asking which of transportation firms or bridge owners can 
either 'prevent or  reduce the probability and/or consequences of the risk occur- 
ring at  the lower marginal cost' may be an oversimplification of the analysis and 
may result in inaccurate risk allocation and contractual design. The preferred 
approach should be to ask 'who can maximize the expected return on their 
investment in accident reduction measures.' Simply to ask who can reduce the 
probability and/or consequences of the risk occurring at the lower marginal cost 
may, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, produce an inefficient presumptive 
rule. The following examples illustrate the point. 
Assume that the expected cost of a particular risk (that is, the expected accident 
costs, eac) is $100. A can, by investing $40, reduce the eac to $70. B, by expending 
$15, can reduce the eac to $80. Clearly it is in the interests of both parties to 
allocate responsibility for this risk to B. 
Assume again that the eac is $100 but in this case A, by expending $6, can reduce 
the eac to $30 while B, by expending $3, can reduce the eac to $40. Clearly, while 
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bridges could cost-effectively minimize collisions between tugboats, 
barges, and bridges. Perhaps bridge owners could install beacons which 
would be transmitted on a medium which tugboat operators use in any 
event, thus warning operators when they approach bridges. If bridge 
owners can prevent accidents from occurring, or otherwise reduce the 
number of accidents which do occur, at a lower marginal cost than the 
transportation firm, then it is clear that we should be internalizing costs 
to the bridge owner and not to the transportation firm. As I noted 
earlier, information as to the identity of the party who can manage 
collision risks most effectively is not generated in most legal proceed- 
ings. However, it would seem, intuitively, that tugboat operators are, in 
general, better equipped to manage those risks. More important, it 
would seem incontrovertible that, as between tugboat operators and 
firms contracting to use bridges - such as .CN - the former group is 
much more likely to be able to reduce the risks of accidents occurring, 
at a lower marginal cost than the latter. Thus while the necessary 
information to access this issue is not available, the cost internalization 
argument, even with this more complicated analysis, would appear to 
support the majority decision in Norsk. 
Second, it may be that the legal system, insofar as it is driven by 
allocative efficiency norms, should not develop legal rules which treat 
all losses as equivalent. Legal rules which are sensitive to efficiency 
norms should, perhaps, distinguish between adverse effects on third 
parties (that is, negative externalities) which are 'technological' from 
those which are 'pecuniary.' Technological externalities consist of costs 
or losses - personal injuries or property damage - in which the produc- 
tive capacity of society's human capital or industrial base is reduced 
temporarily or permanently. In such cases, legal rules should impose 
those costs on the firm which is the most efficient accident avoider. 
Pecuniary externalities, by contrast, consist of costs or losses - usually 
contract entitlements or lost opportunities - in which there is no  
reduction in our social capital, but merely a transfer of wealth from one 
firm to another. For example, the business losses of both pwc and CN 
the eac is lower if we allocate the risk to A, it is better to allocate the risk to B. An 
investment of $3 to obtain a return of $60 is better than an investment of $G to 
obtain a return of $70. 
This is all to say that a prescription stating that we should develop common law 
rules which allocate risks so as to 'minimize expected accident costs' is somewhat of 
an oversimplification. Rather, the objective of the legal system in shaping common 
law rules should be to maximize the expected rate of return on investments in 
accident prevention measures. 
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due to CN's temporary inability to use the bridge were very likely 
someone else's gain. While pecuniary externalities are a subset of social 
costs, they are distributive rather than allocative, and thus categorically 
different from property damage or personal injury. The distinction be- 
tween pecuniary and technological externalities supports La Forest J's 
dissenting judgment which would insulate tugboat and other transpor- 
tation firms from the former subset of externalities. 
The third qualification on a simple cost-internalization argument 
which otherwise might support the majority judgment is produced 
through an analysis of the most efficient way to force internalization by 
transportation firms. For example, the legal rules may, as was done in 
the Norsk decision, give to numerous relational contractors the right to 
sue in tort against transportation firms to recover lost profits and other 
economic losses. Cost internalization in that situation will be produced 
through a combination of cost-efficient accident reduction measures by 
transportation firms, and tort litigation by relational contractors. 
Conversely, the legal rules might, as La Forest J argued, deny relational 
contractors the right to recover economic losses from transportation 
firms. This legal rule would create incentives for relational contractors 
to include a term in their contracts with property owners which stipu- 
late that property owners will bear the losses suffered by relational 
contractors in the event of damage to the property.23 Some property 
owners will then, perhaps, be able to recover that loss as a consequen- 
tial loss in a tort action against the transportation company. The losses 
of what might be substantial numbers of relational contractors will, 
where it is cost effective to do so, be 'channeled' through the property 
owner to the transportation firm.24 While each of these methods is 
equally viable in theory as an instrument which will reduce primary 
costs and internalize externalities, the latter channeling structure will 
be preferable if it will increase the extent of cost internalization which 
takes place. This structure will reduce secondary and tertiary costs and, 
thus, will more likely result in cost internalization and accident-avoid- 
ance measures where justified. Once one investigates the cost-inter- 
nalization issue more closely, La Forest J'S judgment would appear to 
be favoured on efficiency grounds. 
23 This term will be included only where, as between a contracting party and the 
property owner, the property owner is in a better position to manage collision risks 
and the ensuing consequences to contracting parties. As I point out later, in many 
cases that will not be so. 
24 See William Bishop 'Economic Loss in Tort' (1982) 2 OxfmdJ. of Legal Studies, 1, 2. 
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As well, La Forest J'S analysis is supported when one takes into 
account the increased costs of insurance which will be generated by 
allocating risk of property damage and economic losses to transporta- 
tion firms. It is generally assumed that first-party insurance - insurance 
purchased by firms to cover their direct losses if an accident occurs - is 
generally less expensive than third-party liability insurance - insurance 
purchased by firms which might be sued by other firms who experience 
losses. That is, insurance firms would charge transportation firms more 
for protection against lawsuits brought by property owners than the 
same insurance firms would charge property owners for protection 
against damage to their property caused by the same accident. This is 
so simply because the insurance firms are likely to know more about 
the risks they are assuming when they insure a particular piece of 
property than they know about risks when they insure the transporta- 
tion company against damage to as yet undetermined property owned 
by as yet unidentified property owners. Assuming that it is less costly for 
property owners to obtain insurance protecting them from the losses 
associated with damage from accidents caused by transportation firms, 
we ought to prefer a world where the transportation firm is not liable 
for damage to property owners.25 
A final qualification on the cost-internalization rationale for the 
majority position is presented through an assessment of the implica- 
tions of accident and business loss insurance on primary cost-avoidance 
measures. There is some intimation in the decision that the majority 
dismisses the cost-internalization argument by assuming that the exist- 
ence of insurance will attenuate primary accident avoidance mea~ures.'~ 
That is true, but only to a very limited degree. Insurance companies 
can be expected to include terms in their insurance contracts with 
transportation firms as well as with property owners and relational 
contractors, which consensually regulate the behaviour of insured firms 
so as to control and reduce the exposure of the insurance firm to 
claims. For example, insurers of transportation firms may require 
certification of vessels, conlpliance with regulations, proper training of 
personnel, exclusions of some kinds of claims, deductibles, and so 
25 The same argument is developed below in connection with insurance and the 
allocation of risks of economic losses to transportation firms. 
26 Specifically, McLachlin J (at 372-3) implies that, first, to eliminate recovery for 
economic loss would significantly reduce the incentives of transportation firms to 
take care; and, second, that insurance, and in particular insurance for loss profits, 
would be unavailable at a reasonable cost. La Forest J, by contrast, (at 349-50). 
rejects both of these premises. 
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forth. Furthermore, insurance firms will 'risk-rate' insureds into 
categories, thus penalizing individual firms which have the characteris- 
tics of firms which present higher or more numerous claims, or which 
have a personal history of higher or more numerous claims. If in- 
surance firms do this well," the incidence of accidents will not increase 
substantially as a result of insurance coverage. The 'contractual regula- 
tion' by insurance firms, in effect, replaces the deterrent effects of tort 
liability with the deterrent effects of welldesigned insurance policies. 
What this might mean is that the legal system should develop rules 
which allocate accident risks to the party whose insurance company is 
best able to monitor and control primary costs - that is, to the transpor- 
tation firm. However, as I point out below," the issue is complicated 
when one considers a more nuanced assessment of the insurance ques- 
tion, which takes into account insurance for secondary costs. However, 
this analysis does suggest that a societal interest in reducing primary 
accident costs would appear to support the majority judgment in Norsk. 
In the end, an analysis of the impact of legal rules on primary 
accident costs suggests that while the majority judgment in Norsk is 
defensible, there are a number of important qualifications on a simplis- 
tic cost-internalization argument which might otherwise justify impos- 
ing liability on transportation firms. These qualifications operate more 
strongly in the context of an analysis of the allocation of risks of 
economic losses experienced by relational contractors, and, taken 
together, offer considerable support for the minority position articu- 
lated by La Forest J. This support is strengthened when one extends the 
analysis of legal rules to take into account their impact on secondary 
and tertiary costs. 
REDUCING SECONDARY COSTS 
Once we have designed a liability rule which will optimally reduce the 
number of accidents which occur, we must then reconsider the design 
of that rule in the light of a societal interest in reducing the consequences 
of those accidents which cannot be eliminated in a cost-effective 
manner. One significant way to reduce the consequences of accidents is 
through 'loss-spreading.' The consequences of accidents are reduced - 
that is, welfare losses experienced by firms and individuals are lessened 
- when many individuals and firms bear a relatively small loss, as 
27 And there is, i t  might he argued, a sufficient degree of competition within the 
insurance industry to expect this to be the case. 
28 See under the heading Reducing Tertiary Costs, infra. 
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compared with the situation where one or two individuals or firms face 
highly focused, catastrophic losses. The question then becomes, what 
set of legal rules will result in the greatest amount of loss-spreading? 
First, we might look at the structure of transportation firms, property 
owning firms and relational contracting firms, and their associated 
relationships among one another, to determine the implications of 
shifting losses from one to the other through tort law, as compared 
with the implications of leaving losses where they fall. At this point the 
question becomes, as between transportation firms, property owners, 
and relational contractors, who is the most efficient insurer against the 
consequences of accidents? Prior to examining some answers to that 
question, we should note that lossspreading can take place through the 
purchase of insurance from independent or captive insurance com- 
panies or through self-insurance as firms factor expected losses into 
production decisions and reallocate them through price, dividend, and 
wage adjustments. 
In my analysis of primary accident costs, I suggested that it is gener- 
ally assumed that first-party insurance - insurance purchased by firms 
to cover their direct losses if an accident occurs - is generally less 
expensive than third-party liability insurance - insurance purchased by 
firms which might be sued by other firms who experience losses. This 
led to a conclusion that the cost-internalization benefits of making 
transportation firms liable for property damage and economic losses 
would be offset, to some degree, by the increased insurance costs and 
the reduction in insurance coverage associated with that rule. Assum- 
ing that it is less costly for property owners to obtain insurance protect- 
ing them from the losses associated with damage from accidents caused 
by transportation firms, we ought to prefer a world where the transpor- 
tation firm is not liable for damage to property owners. 
Similarly, one predicts that insurance firms will generally charge 
both transportation firms and property owners more for third-party 
liability insurance protection against lawsuits brought by relational 
contractors for recovery of economic losses than the same insurance 
firms would charge those contractors .directly for first-party insurance 
against business losses which the contractors experience. This is so 
simply because the insurance firms know more about the risks faced by 
the firms for which they provide first-party insurance than they do 
about the unknowable claims which third-party liability insurance must 
apply to. Insurance firms know more about the business risks faced by 
relational contractors - the first-party insurance case - than about the 
risks they would be assuming on behalf of transportation companies 
faced with economic loss claims. This suggests that the dissenting 
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position of La Forest J is preferable, and that transportation firms 
should not be held liable when others can purchase insurance at a 
much lower cost for the same anticipated incident. La Forest J's 
decision would place responsibility for obtaining first-party liability 
insurance against business losses on relational contractors. This would 
appear to be an efficient outcome, at least as compared with the 
outcome produced by McLachlin J'S judgment, which places respon- 
sibility on transportation firms to obtain third-party liability insurance 
against at least some business losses experienced by relational contrac- 
tors. If La Forest ~'sjudgment were to prevail, not only would relational 
contractors obtain insurance for their business losses at a lower mar- 
ginal cost than could transportation firms and insurance companies for 
the same coverage, but insurance firms could ensure that relational 
contractors reduce their loss exposure through the development of al- 
ternative transportation measures, or through risk allocation arrange- 
ments in their subcontracts, which would be available in emergency 
situations. Whatever the option chosen, economic incentives to allocate 
the risk of transportation accidents through contractual negotiation are 
substantially reduced if, as McLachlinJ would have it, at least some rela- 
tional contractors are given a claim in tort against transportation firms. 
Finally, an analysis of the way in which legal rules affect secondary 
costs suggests that transportation firms should not be liable for business 
losses experienced by relational contractors, because this immunity will 
increase the incentive for relational contractors to negotiate with 
property owners for protection against those losses. This, in turn, 
ensures that, as between property owners and relational contractors, 
the cost of the accident will be allocated to the party who can manage 
the risk of accidents in the most cost-effective manner. Where that 
contractual risk-shifting does not occur, relational contractors, knowing 
they cannot recover in tort against transportation firms and knowing 
that they cannot recover against the property owners in contract, can 
mitigate the consequences of accidents in other ways. Perhaps relation- 
al contractors can purchase options to use alternative modes of trans- 
portation at a cost which is less than property owners' costs of ensuring 
access to the . bridge. Perhaps relational contractors can negotiate 
subcontracts with consignors so as to relieve relational contractors of 
liability for delays in delivery due to bridge closures. All of this suggests, 
confirming the efficiency rationale for La Forest~'s judgment, that the 
consequences of transportation accidents could be significantly re- 
duced if the risk of those consequences were placed on relational 
contractors, such as CN, and not on transportation firms. 
This efficient allocation of the risk of bridge closures will occur so 
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long as contractual freedom exists - that is, in the absence of govern- 
mental regulation of the terms of the relevant contracts - and so long 
as there are no systematic informational errors which lead parties to 
make inefficient decisions. McLachlin J is simply wrong when she saysm 
that inequality of bargaining power results in attenuation of efficient 
contractual risk allocation. First, there is no reason to assume, in 
general, and as between property owners and relational contractors, 
that one party could systematically exploit informational errors and 
thus negotiate inefficient risk allocation arrangements. Mere inequality 
of market power may affect the distribution of the gains associated with 
efficient risk allocation, but will not affect the allocative arrangements 
themselves. 
REDUCING TERTIARY COSTS 
The final stage in an analysis of the efficiency implications of legal 
doctrine is to attempt to reduce the administrative costs of the accident 
compensation system through which the legal rule will be imple- 
mented. For example, a legal rule such as that articulated in the dissent 
in Nmsk, which establishes clear legal entitlements - so-called 'bright 
lines' between liability and no-liability states - are generally preferable 
to more nuanced standards. First, they provide clear signals to parties 
as to who must take steps to prevent accidents and obtain insurance 
and, thus, reduce duplication and waste. Second, bright lines reduce 
uncertainty, which, to most firms and individuals, represents an addi- 
tional cost of engaging in business or other activities. Finally, bright 
lines reduce the public and private administrative costs of determining 
whether a particular plaintiff falls within the class of persons who have 
legal entitlements. With that in mind, it is eminently sensible to limit 
actions against transportation companies exclusively to property owners 
- and to exclude relational contractors - and thus provide a clear line 
demarcating who can sue and who cannot. There are significant costs 
associated with the majority decision in Norsk which would permit non- 
property owners to argue that they are effectively 'owners of property' 
due to some informal, implicit joint venture or partnership relation- 
ship, or because they are the primary users of the property, or because 
they own property around the property in question or are, in some 
sense, believed to be the owners of the pr~perty.~" Clearly, none of 
29 At 374. 
30 McLachlin J,  accepting the reasoning of the trial judge, held that CN could be 
characterized as a tjoint' or 'common venturer' with PWC and thereby be entitled to 
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these situations, or any others like them, serve to make them property 
owners identifiable through a clearly delineated legal rule, and con- 
cerns with tertiary costs suggests that they should not be treated as 
such. 
The reduction of administrative costs also implies that legal rules 
should be developed which tend to deny liability since, by doing so, 
society avoids both private litigation costs as well as the public subsidiza- 
tion of private legal action. Rules which allow recovery of economic 
losses by relational contractors substantially increase litigation costs 
beyond what they would have been if only property owners were per- 
mitted to litigate rights arising from transportation incidents. Further- 
more, this rule again provides incentives to relational contractors to 
assess the risk of business interruption and negotiate the allocation of 
that risk during negotiation of the contract to use the property. These 
negotiation costs are private, not public and, more importantly, are 
likely to be substantially less than the costs of litigation even when 
taken in the aggregate. That is, secondary as well as tertiary cost avoid- 
ance considerations suggest the advantage of channeling structures. 
Finally, a societal interest in reducing tertiary costs implies the 
development of legal rules which lead to single insurers over multiple 
insurers. Where a no-liability rule forces relational contractors to insure 
against business losses, one might expect substantial administrative 
costs associated with the negotiation of large numbers of these first- 
party insurance policies. One alternative is to impose liability on 
transportation firms, who then take out one policy (a third-party 
liability policy) which provides coverage against claims from large 
numbers of relational contractors. Where the cost of the insurance 
exceeds the benefits to the particular transportation firm, a liability 
rule imposing risks of relational contractor business losses on transpor- 
tation firms may result in avoidance of the transaction costs of in- 
surance entirely. Avoiding these transaction costs would be associated 
with their replacement by litigation and settlement costs where trans- 
portation accidents occur. This advantage, though, might be more 
recover for its economic loss. She stated (at 376), 'The reasoning, as I apprehend it, is 
that where the plaintiffs operations are so closely allied to the operations of the party 
suffering physical damage and to its property (which - as damaged -causes the plain- 
tiff s loss) that it can be considered ajoint venturer with the owner of the property, 
the plaintiff can recover its economic loss even though the plaintiff has suffered no  
physical damage to its own property. To  deny recovery in such circumstances would 
be to deny it to a person who for practical purposes is in the same position as if he o r  
she owned the property physically damaged.' See also supra, note 2. 
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apparent than real. Relational contractors, even under a rule which 
does not preclude their suing transportation firms, may insure in any 
event in order to avoid litigation costs and, by so doing, buy into a strict 
liability regime which will avoid or reduce delays in obtaining compen- 
sation. 
Conclusion 
This comment has been predicated upon one definition of efficiency 
and one model of law and economics analysis in arriving at the out- 
comes presented. Other definitions and models - Coasian, cost-benefit 
analysis - may well produce other answers, other ways of viewing the 
problem, or other sets of criteria upon which to make future decisions 
as to the best distribution of costs and liability risks. Ultimately, know- 
ing whether a particular legal rule is efficient relative to the alternatives 
must depend on the acquisition of substantial amounts of information 
about the behaviour of large numbers of firms and individuals in the 
future and not on the facts which arise from litigation and the courts. 
The inadequacy of the current legal institutions to generate the in- 
formation necessary to arrive at defensible prescriptions on the efficacy 
of particular legal rules provides another basis for supporting the 
dissent of La Forest J over the outcome under the majority judgment. 
The major insight generated by the Coase theorem3' is that if parties 
are free to bargain costlessly, the ultimate allocation of legal liability 
(or, put another way, the ultimate allocation of a legal entitlement) is 
independent of the initial determination of liability (or the initial 
allocation of the legal entitlement) by the legal system. It may be that 
transportation firms are not, in general, the superior risk-bearers in 
relation to economic loss suffered by relational contractors. In that 
case, and in the light of the transaction costs involved, the majority 
decision of the Supreme Court holding transportation firms respon- 
sible for the losses of relational contractors cannot be corrected 
through bilateral or multilateral contractual negotiation through which 
the risks could be reallocated to the superior insurer or risk-bearer.32 
Conversely, the legal rule produced by La Forest J'S dissenting judg- 
ment, which allocates the risk of loss to relational contractors, can, at a 
relatively low cost, be trumped by contractual risk allocations between 
31 R. Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 J. of Larv €3 Econ. 1. 
32 A specious caveat to that assertion would be the possibility of transportation firms 
identifying major relational contractors ex ante, and negotiating with then1 to shift 
the risk of economic losses to the relational contractor where it is efficient to do so. 
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the relational contractors and the property owner in circumstances 
where the property owner is the superior risk-bearer. In this situation, 
the relational loss can be reallocated to the transportation firm through 
the recovery of consequential damages by the property owner against 
the transportation Again, if one considers the consequences of a 
misallocation of risk by the legal system, the dissenting judgment of La 
Forest J would appear to be preferable insofar as it permits the legal 
system and contractual negotiation between the parties to remedy the 
legal error.34 
Economic analysis of law suggests that, if efficiency is a dominant 
norm which should shape social ordering in this context, La Forest J'S 
dissent should be adopted as the governing legal rule. Furthermore, 
economic analysis of law suggests that even if La ForestJ's dissent is not 
efficient, it is more likely than what seems to be the inefficient decision 
of the majority to be corrected over time through contractual negotia- 
tion and tort law. 
33 This conteniplates a situation where the contract between the property owner and 
the relational contractor imposes liability upon the property owner for any un- 
planned closures of the bridge. The economic losses suffered by the property owner 
niight then be characterized as positive outlays (due and owing under contract) and 
not simply as lost profits (where remoteness rules may preclude recovery). Support 
for the recovery of economic losses in the form of positive outlays can be found in the 
case of Dominimz Tape of Canada O d .  v. L.R. Md)onald &Sons ZA., [I9711 3 OR 627. 
The plaintiff, the owner ofa manufacturing plant, sued for the recovery oflost profits 
and wages when the negligently loaded trailer of the defendant knocked over apower 
pole, causing a power failure. The Court ruled that while the loss of profit was 
foreseeable, itwas too remote. However, the wages were recoverable in that they were 
a 'proximate and direct consequence of the wrongful act of the defendants and not 
too remote to be recovered.' Such losses can be contrasted with 'negative' losses 
consisting of a 'mere deprivation of an opportunity to earn an income.' As Linden 
notes (supra note 15,385): '011 the basis of this approach, which is not too dissimilar 
to the property damage cases, economic losses that take the form of actual expenses 
incurred, as contrasted to potential profits that are not earned, may yield liability.' 
It should be obvious that if  the Court is willing to allow recovery by CN for relational 
losses of the kind under discussion -that is, pure economic loss- there is little, if any, 
difference. in allowing recovery of such provable consequential economic losses 
suffered by the property owner. The foreseeabilityand remotenessconsiderations are 
clearly identical, if not stronger in the latter case. 
34 This reallocation will not occur, however, where the relational contractor is, as 
between it and the property owner, the superior risk bearer; and where, simul- 
taneously, the transportation firm is the superior risk bearer as between it and the 
property owner; and where the transportation firm is, as between it and the 
relational contractor, the superior risk bearer. 
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